My thanks go out to Russ Shafer-Landau and Terence Cuneo, who put together the excellent Foundations of Ethics anthology upon which this page’s articles and organization are drawn.

Moral Error Theories


  • “A Critique of Ethics” by AJ Ayer
  • “How To Be an Ethical Anti-Realist” by Simon Blackburn
  • “Nondescriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethic” by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons
  • “The Reasons of a Living Being” by Allan Gibbard


  • “Moral Relativism Defended” by Gilbert Harman
  • “The Authority of Reflection” by Christine Korsgaard
  • “Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer” by Roderick Firth
  • “Contractarian Constructivism” by Ronald Milo

Sensibility Theories

  • “Value and Secondary Qualities” by John McDowell
  • “A Sensible Subjectivism?” by David Wiggins

Moral Realism

Moral Motivation

  • “The Externalist Challenge” by Michael Smith
  • “Externalist Moral Motivation” by Nick Zangwill
  • “Virtue as Knowledge: Objections from the Philosophy of Mind” by Margaret Olivia Little
  • “Acting for a Good Reason” by Jonathan Dancy

Moral Reasons

Moral Explanations

  • “Ethics and Observation” by Gilbert Harman
  • “Moral Explanations” by Nicholas Sturgeon
  • “Moral Facts as Configuring Causes” by Terence Cuneo

Moral Disagreement

  • “The Nature of Ethical Disagreement” by Charles Stevenson
  • “Moral Disagreement” by David Brink

Moral Knowledge

  • Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics” by Norman Daniels
  • “Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics” by Robert Audi

Moral Supervenience

Semantic Puzzles

  • “The Subject-Matter of Ethics” by GE Moore
  • “Attitudes and Contents” by Simon Blackburn
  • “Expressivism and Embedding” by Walter-Sinnott Armstrong
  • “New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth” by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons

One response to “Metaethics

  1. Dude, your website is like heaven for philosophy students.

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