Philosophy of Cognitive Science

  • “A ‘Not Merely Empirical’ Argument for a Language of Thought” by G. Rey
  • “Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-desire Thesis” by Stephen Stich
  • “Beliefs and Sub-Doxastic States” by Stephen Stich
  • “Blurry Images, Double Vision, and Other Oddities: New Problems for Representationalism?” by Michael Tye
  • “Cognitive Wheels: The Frame Problem of AI” by Daniel Dennett
  • “Compositionality: A Connectionist Variation on a Classic Theme” by Gelder
  • “Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search” by Newell and Simon
  • “Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture” by Fodor and Pylyshyn
  • “Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology” by Stich et al.
  • “Experience Without the Head” by Alva Noe
  • “Externalism and Inference” by Paul Boghossian
  • “Neural Representation and Neural Computation” by Patricia Churchland and Sejnowski
  • “Folk Psychology and the Explanation of Human Behavior” by Paul Churchland
  • “Folk Psychology Is Here to Stay” by Horgan and Woodward
  • “Functionalism, Information, and Content” by Gulick
  • “‘How Does It Work?’ Versus ‘What Are the Laws?’: Two Conceptions of Psychological Explanation” by R. Cummins
  • “How Not to Find Neural Correlates of Consciousness” by Ned Block
  • “How To Think About Modularity of Mind-Reading” by Currie and Sterelny
  • “Individualism and Supervenience” by Jerry Fodor
  • “Interpretation Psychologized” by Alvin Goldman
  • “Knowing One’s Own Mind” by Donald Davidson
  • “Language and Thinking About Thoughts” by JL Bermudez
  • “Language, Thought, and Communication” by Gilbert Harman
  • “Levels of Description in Non-classical Cognitive Science” by Horgan and Tienson
  • “Non-conceptual Mental Content” by John McDowell
  • “Origins of Domain Specificity: The Evolution of Functional Organization” by Cosmides and Tooby
  • “Perception Without Awareness” by Fred Dretske
  • “Personal and Sub-Personal Levels of Explanation” by Daniel Dennett
  • “Physicalist Thinking and Conceptions of Behavior” by J. Hornsby
  • “Real Patterns” by Daniel Dennett
  • “Reduction of Mind” by David Lewis
  • “Reference, Causal Powers, Externalist Intuitions and Unicorns” by Segal
  • “Semantic Engines: An Introduction to Mind Design” by John Haugeland
  • “Semantic Theory and Tacit Knowledge” by Evans
  • “Simple Seeing” by Fred Dretske
  • “Simulation Without Introspection or Inference from Me or You” by RM Gordon
  • “The Argument from Causal Powers” by Robert Wilson
  • “The Attraction of Parallel Distributed Processing for Modeling Cognition” by Mcleod et al.
  • “The Cognitive Functions of Language” by Peter Carruthers
  • “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience” by Gilbert Harman
  • “The Language of Thought: First Approximations” by Jerry Fodor
  • “The Persistence of the Attitudes” by Jerry Fodor
  • “The Superiority of HOP to HOT” by William Lycan
  • “Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority” by McLaughlin
  • “What Should We Expect From A Theory of Consciousness?” by Patricia Churchland
  • “Which Language Do We Think With?” by Peter Carruthers
  • “Why There Has to Be and How There Could Be A Private Language” by Jerry Fodor
  • “Vision” by Marr

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