Philosophy of Language

  • “A Puzzle About Belief” by Saul Kripke
  • “Context and Communication” by Stephen Neale
  • “Descriptions” by Bertrand Russell
  • “Deep Structure as Logical Form” by Gilbert Harman
  • “Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content” by Scott Soames
  • “Elucidations of Meaning” by James Higgenbotham
  • “Identity and Necessity” by Saul Kripke
  • “Indefinite Descriptions: A Defense of Russell” by Neal and Ludlow
  • “Intensional ‘Transitive’ Verbs and Concealed Complement Causes” by Dikken et al.
  • “Interpreted Logical Forms” by Larson and Ludlow
  • “Knowledge of Meaning and the Theory of Truth” by Larson and Segal
  • “Logical Form as a Level of Linguistic Representation” by Robert May
  • “Meaning and Reference” by Hilary Putnam
  • “Opacity and Scope” by Barbara Partee
  • “On Denoting” by Bertrand Russell
  • “On Meaning” by Paul Grice
  • “On Referring” by PF Strawson
  • “On Saying That” by Donald Davidson
  • “On Sense and Reference” by Gottlob Frege
  • “On Synonymy and Indirect Discourse” by Israel Scheffler
  • “Reference and Definite Description” by Keith Donnellan
  • “Referential and Quantificational Indefinites” by Janet Fodor and Ivan Sag
  • “Semantic Structure and Logical Form” by Gareth Evans
  • “Some Remarks on Logical Form” by Ludwig Wittgenstein
  • “Sententialist Theories of Belief” by Stephen Shiffer
  • “Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference” by Saul Kripke
  • “The Logical Form of Action Sentences” by Donald Davidson
  • “The Meaning of Meaning” by Hilary Putnam
  • “The Method of Intension” by Rudolf Carnap
  • “The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs” by Crimmins and Perry
  • The Thought: A Logical Inquiry” by Gottlob Frege
  • “Translation and Meaning” by WVO Quine
  • “Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions” by Paul Grice
  • “What is a Theory of Meaning?” by Michael Dummett
  • “What Model-Theoretic Semantics Cannot Do” by Ernest Lapore
  • “Vagaries of Reference” by WVO Quine

Supplements

Theories of Meaning” “Structured Propositions” “Speech Acts” “Situations in Natural Language Semantics” “Singular Propositions” “Speech Acts” “Schema” “Rigid Designators” “Reference” “Quotation” “Propositions” “Propositional Attitude Reports” “Private Language” “Presupposition” “Names” “Intensional Transitive Verbs” “Innateness and Language” “Dynamics Semantics” “Descriptions” “Definitions” “Compositionality” “Assertions” SeP entries “Ambiguity”

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